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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Emergency vaccination will possibly be used in controlling a future outbreak of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in 
the Netherlands (see 'Concept Beleidsdraaiboek Klassieke Varkenspest' (Anonymous, 2005)). A marker vaccine 
is available that enables the distinction between infected vaccinated animals and noninfected vaccinated animals. 
However, concerns exist that animals are only slowly protected by this type of vaccination and they may be 
infected subclinically. Using mathematical modelling, this research project (Bergevoet et al., 2007) will address 
two questions: 
- Which emergency vaccination strategies can effectively be applied to control CSF epidemics? 
- How can we declare areas free of infection and do emergency vaccination strategies increase the risks 
encountered in declaring freedom of infection? 
 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
We developed a mathematical model that describes the effects of marker vaccination and transmission of CSF 
virus between individual animals, between pens and between farms. The results of transmission experiments and 
the outbreak data of the CSF epidemic that occurred in the Netherlands in 1997 and 1998, serve to calibrate the 
multi-level model. We applied this model on the situation of 2006, with in total 9000 pig farms. Distinctions 
were made between finisher farms (consisting only of finishing pigs), and multiplier farms (consisting of 
separate sow and piglet sections). Different control strategies were compared: three emergency vaccination 
strategies (in 1 km, 2 km and 5 km rings) and preemptive ring culling in 1 km radius around a detected herd. 
Thousand simulations were carried out for each control strategy. The resulting simulated epidemics were 
subjected to six end screening scenarios that differ in the number of animals sampled per farm type. 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
In Table 1 results are summarized for outbreaks that occurred mainly in pig farm dense areas in the Netherlands 
and that were controlled using different control strategies. As a measure for the effectivity of a control strategy, 
the outbreak size, the duration and the effective reproduction number between herds Rh of the simulated 
epidemics are evaluated. 
 
Table 1 Results for outbreaks which have started with 11-20 infectious herds at the moment of the first detection 
of an infected herd (between brackets the two-sided 95% interval). 
control strategy number of  
detected herds 
number of  
not detected herds 
duration (days) Rh* 
1 km ring culling 18 (9-57) 0 (0-1) 92 (36-278) 0.49 (0.08-1.22) 
1 km ring vaccination  22 (9-84) 1 (1-9) 111 (36-313) 0.53 (0.09-1.30) 
2 km ring vaccination 19 (9-49) 2 (2-8) 95 (36-233) 0.46 (0.08-1.08) 
5 km ring vaccination 15 (8-29) 2 (2-8) 71 (34-171) 0.35 (0.05-0.84) 
* The effective reproduction number between herds Rh is here defined for 'second generation herds': this is the 
number of infections that is caused by a herd that was infected by a herd that was infectious at the moment of the 
first detection of an infected herd. 
 
 The results show that 1 km ring vaccination is less effective than 1 km ring culling. This is not surprising as it 
takes some time for vaccination to build protection (typically two weeks), whereas culling works 
instantaneoulsy. The effectiveness of vaccination in 2 km radius around an infected herd is comparable to 1 km 
ring culling. The most effective strategy is 5 km ring vaccination, which yields an effective reproduction number 
significantly below unity. 
 
Vaccination increases the chance that a within-farm outbreak remains undetected during the epidemic, because 
more small outbreaks occur on vaccinated farms that were infected before the vaccine gave full protection. The 
number of these undetected outbreaks increases with increasing vaccination radius, compared to the total 
epidemic size. After the epidemic they need to be detected during the end screening to prevent them entering the 
food chain. The chance that they also escape detection during the end screening depends on the sample sizes 
taken on the different type of farms (finishers, sows or piglets and vaccinated or unvaccinated). 
 
The recommended end screening scenario is to sample 1 animal per pen on all vaccinated farms, 1 animal per 
pen on unvaccinated finisher farms and a random sample as required by the EU for unvaccinated multiplier 
farms (i.e. 32 piglets and 61 sows). Using this scenario, the absolute number of seropositive animals which are 
missed by the end screening is on average 3-5 animals in the entire country, with an upper boundary of 10-18 
animals (95% quantile). Applying more stringent end screening scenarios (e.g. sampling 2 animals per pen 
instead of 1) can’t lower these numbers  much. The most important result however, is that the risk of missing 
infected animals during the end screening is not different for preemptive culling or emergency vaccination 
strategies. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
In conclusion, emergency vaccination can be as effective a control strategy as pre-emptive culling to control CSF 
epidemics, provided that a larger vaccination radius is used. However, it is to be expected that the end screening 
will detect a number of small outbreaks on vaccinated farms, which would set back the infection free status. 
Therefore it is recommendable to start with (intermediate) screenings as soon as seems acceptable. When a 
sufficiently stringent end screening scenario is used, vaccination does not increase the risk of missing 
seropositive animals. 
 
The simulation results have also been used by LEI for the economical analysis. They concluded that the largest 
part of the losses is caused by the decreased revenues of animals slaughtered due to welfare problems, and not 
the decreased value of meat of vaccinated animals. The extent of these problems depends on duration of the 
outbreak and the size of the area with movement restrictions.  
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